Monographs Emotion as Feeling Towards Value: A Theory of Emotional Experpeince. Oxford University Press, 2021. Amazon Link
Much of what we take to be meaningful and significant in life is inextricably linked with our capacity to experience emotions. Here, I consider emotional experiences as sui generis states; not to be modelled after other mental states such as perceptions, judgements, or bodily feelings, but given their own analysis and place within our mental economy. More specifically, I propose an original view of emotional experiences as feelings-towards-values.
Reviews: "Overall, the book offers a personal-level account of emotions as they present themselves in first-person experience or, as Mitchell alternatively frames his project, an analysis of the ‘manifest image’ of emotion. It is a sustained and rigorous exercise in analytical phenomenology" (Müller and Döring (2023) in Mind)
"Jonathan Mitchell’s Emotion as Feeling towards Value is a sustained and careful defense of an intriguing theory of emotion as a distinctive kind of evaluative representation...Mitchell’s book, while relatively short, is very rich in details and nuances. And the clarity of Mitchell’s writing is exemplary given the elusiveness of such a phenomenon as emotional experience" (Naar (2023) in Ethics).
Edited Collections 2. ‘Philosophy of Emotion: Phenomenology of Value’, special issue of Inquiry (co-edited with Joel Smith), 2022
Peer-Reviewed Journal Articles 3. Phenomenological Disjunctivism, forthcoming in Ergo - PDF LINK 4. Sartre’s Exclusion Claim: Perception and Imagination as Radically Distinct Consciousnesses’, forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy - PDF LINK 5. Towards Affective-Evaluativism: The Intentional Structure of Unpleasant Pain Experience’, in Philosophical Quarterly, 2024, https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae002 6. The Horizonal Structure of Visual Experience, forthcoming in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2023 PDF LINK 7. Exploring Affective-Evaluative Horizons, forthcoming in Journal of Consciousness Studies, 2023. PDF LINK 8. Emotion and Attention, in Philosophical Studies 80 (73-99), 2023. PDF LINK 9. The Phenomenal Contribution of Attention, in Inquiry, online early view 2022, doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2022.2107061. PDF LINK 10. Experiencing Mandates: Towards a Hybrid Account, in Australasian Journal of Philosophy, online early view 2021, doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2021.1995013. PDF LINK 11. Affective Shifts: Mood, Emotion and Well-Being, in Synthese 199, 11793–11820, 2021, doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03312-3. PDF LINK 12. The Mind’s Presence to Itself: In Search of Non-Intentional Awareness, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, online early view 2021, https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12804. PDF LINK 13. Self-Locating Content in Visual Experience and the ‘Here-Replacement’ Account, in Journal of Philosophy 118 (4), 188-213, 2021. PDF LINK 14. Two Irreducible Classes of Emotional Experiences: Sartre on Affective Imaginings an Affective Perceptions, in European Journal of Philosophy, online early view, 2021, doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12648. PDF LINK 15. The Bodily Attitudinal Theory of Emotion, in Philosophical Studies 178, 2635-2663, 2021. PDF LINK 16. Another Look at Mode Intentionalism, in Erkenntnis 87, 2519-2546 2021. PDF LINK 17. Liking That It Hurts: The Case of the Masochist and Second-Order Desire Accounts of Pain’s Unpleasantness, in American Philosophical Quarterly (59(2), 181-189 2021. PDF LINK 18. A Nietzschean Theory of Emotional Experience: Affect as Feeling Toward Value, in Inquiry, 2020, online early view, doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1850341. PDF LINK 19. The Attitudinal Opacity of Emotional Experience, in Philosophical Quarterly, 2020, 70 (28): 524-546. PDF LINK 20. Emotional Experience and Propositional Content, in dialectica, 2019, 73 (4), 535-61. PDF LINK 21. Understanding Meta-Emotions: Prospects for a Perceptualist Account, forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2019, 50 (4): 505-523. https://doi.org/10.1017/can.2019.47. PDF LINK 22. Affective Representation and Affective Attitudes in Synthese, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02294-7. PDF Link 23. Pre-Emotional Value Awareness and the Content-Priority View, in Philosophical Quarterly, 2019, 69 (227), 771-94. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqz018. PDF LINK 24. Emotional Intentionality and the Attitude-Content Distinction, in Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2019, 100 (2), 359-86. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12270. PDF LINK 25. Can Evaluativism about Unpleasant Pains meet the Normative Condition? in Inquiry, 2019, 62 (7), 779-802. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1562377. PDF LINK 26. The Irreducibility of Emotional Phenomenology in Erkenntnis, 2018, 85: 1241-1268. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-018-0075-8. PDF LINK 27. The Intentionality and Intelligibility of Moods in European Journal of Philosophy, 2018, 27 (1), 118-134. https://doi.org/10.1111/ejop.12385. PDF LINK 28. On the Non-Conceptual Content of Affective-Evaluative Experience in Synthese, 2018, 197: 3087-3111. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs11229-018-1872-y. PDF LINK 29. The Epistemology of Emotional Experience in dialectica 71(1), 2017, 57-84. PDF Link - http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1746-8361.12171/full. PDF LINK 30. A Nietzschean Critique of Metaphysical Philosophy in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2017, 48(3), 347-74. PDF Link 31. Nietzsche on Taste: Epistemic Privilege and Anti-Realism in Inquiry, 2017 60(1-2), 31-65. www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/0020174X.2016.1251166 - PDF Link 32. Nietzschean Self-Overcoming, in Journal of Nietzsche Studies, 2016, 47(3) 323-50. muse.jhu.edu/article/640464 - PDF Link
Chapters in Edited Volumes 33. Emotions as Forming a Parallel Epistemic World, collection in honour of Ronald de Sousa, forthcoming. PDF LINK 34. The Varieties of Mood Intentionality, in Mood – Interdisciplinary Perspectives, New Theories, Warwick Series in the Humanities: Routledge, 2019, 1-18. PDF Link
Book Reviews 35. Review of Berislav Marusic, On the temporality of emotions: An essay on grief, anger, and love, forthcoming in European Journal of Philosophy. PDF LINK 36. Review of Jean-Moritz Müller, The World-Directedness of Emotional Feeling (Palgrave Macmillan), forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly. PDF LINK 37. Review of Tom Stern (ed.), The New Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2020. https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/the-new-cambridge-companion-to-nietzsche/ 38. Review of Manuel Dries (ed.), Nietzsche on Consciousness and the Embodied Mind, (De Gruyter), Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2019. https://ndpr.nd.edu/reviews/nietzsche-on-consciousness-and-the-embodied-mind/ 39. Review of Paul Katsafanas, The Nietzschean Self: Moral Psychology, Agency, and the Unconscious (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Ethics 127(3), 777-82, 2017. http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/690077 - PDF Link 40. Review of Maudemarie Clark, Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press), Journal of Nietzsche Studies 47(3), 492-96, 2016- PDF Link 41. Review of Ken Gemes and John Richardson, eds. The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Journal of Nietzsche Studies 46(2), 492-97, 2016. muse.jhu.edu/article/586942 - PDF Link
Public Philosophy Publications 42. ‘Philosophy can help us deal with failures that seem insurmountable’ in The Conversation, November 2022. LINK