

Exploring Affective-Evaluative Horizons

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Abstract: A key claim of Classical Phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other Classical Phenomenologists in terms of *horizontal intentionality* or *intentional horizons*. Its most interesting form is labelled the ‘inner horizon’. My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for thinking that affective-evaluative experiences, predominately conscious emotions, exhibit a form of implicit intentionality in terms of an inner horizon. I suggest that one plausible way of motivating this idea is by reference to the normative phenomenology of the relevant experiences, in which particular objects’ values are presented as either an ideal ‘ought to be’ or an ideal ‘ought not to be’.

Introduction

A key claim of Classical Phenomenology is that *intentional experiences* involve a distinctive kind of implicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is (along with the relevant explicit intentionality) purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences. Put otherwise, in the absence of the relevant form of implicit intentionality the experience would have a different *objectual* phenomenology – the object wouldn’t seem the way it does – and so would have a different overall sense or meaning. This implicit intentionality is often framed by Husserl and other Classical Phenomenologists in terms of *intentional horizons*. Its most interesting, but puzzling, form is labelled the ‘inner horizon’.¹ Broadly stated, the Phenomenologists’ idea of an inner horizon concerns possible experiential presentations of objects that while not properly present – not ‘primordially

¹ For discussion of this idea in Classical Phenomenology see Husserl 1973: §8; 1982: §41 and §44; 1977: §19; 1997: §16, §18 §24 (for an overview of Husserl’s view see Drummond 1990: Ch.8, and Jorba 2016); Gurwitsch 1964, Part 4; Merleau-Ponty 2002: 6. For a discussion of Merleau-Ponty’s view of the horizontality of visual experience, see Kelly 2004: 74-110. The notion of inner horizons is also essential to Edith Stein’s (1970) account of perceiving other subjects. The idea of an ‘outer horizon’ is broadly equivalent to something like an *intentional background*. My focus here is squarely on the *inner horizon* of intentional experiences.

present', or 'given with intuitive fullness' as Husserl puts it – nonetheless are essential to our experience of the relevant object *as it is presented*.

My aim in this paper is to consider whether a case can be made for thinking that affective-evaluative experiences, predominately conscious emotions, also exhibit a form of implicit intentionality in terms of an inner horizon.² I explore the idea that affective experiences have a *sui generis* inner horizon, not reducible to the horizontal intentionality of the intentional states on which they are based. I suggest that one plausible way of motivating this idea is by reference to the normative phenomenology of the relevant class of experiences, in which particular objects' values are presented as either an ideal 'ought to be' (in the case of a positive value) or an ideal 'ought not to be' (in the case of a negative value) – more on this later.

The broader import of the paper is as follows. It is widely accepted – in philosophy of emotion and cognate fields – that affective-evaluative experiences are intentional experiences, which have particular objects, and perhaps also represent those objects as possessing relevant evaluative properties. If affective-evaluative experiences also necessarily include implicit intentionality, understood in terms of a distinctive kind of inner horizon, then this suggests a more complex picture of the intentional structure of these states than is on offer in the current literature. As such, this paper provides a further clarification on the structure and nature of affective-evaluative intentionality.

The roadmap of the paper is as follows. Section 1 clarifies the notion of inner horizons by reference to spatial perception. Section 2 then brings into focus the target experiences, affective-evaluative experiences, and considers a version of the claim that such experiences have an inner horizon in reference to the intentional states on which they are based. Section 3 explores and to some extent defends the thesis that such experiences include a *sui generis* inner horizon, as connected to the normative phenomenology of those experiences. Note, while I provide a qualified defence of this thesis, as will be seen it is dependent on certain more or less controversial claims. So, it is more in the spirit of *exploring* how one might motivate the idea of a *sui generis* affective-evaluative inner horizon, than providing conclusive reasons for accepting some such idea, that the current paper is offered.

1. Clarifying inner horizons (the spatial case)

The relevant form of implicit horizontal intentionality under discussion is most easily clarified by reference to cases of spatial perception. Consider the following example. Standing in front

² Jean-Paul Sartre appeals to the idea of Husserlian inner horizons in the context of discussing the specific case of affective anticipations of future value connected to dissatisfaction in presence (see Poellner 2022: Ch.7 for discussion). My interest here is in the broader class of affective-evaluative experiences.

of a house, we are only visually presented with its front-side, given in terms of a particular array of colour and spatial properties from our perspectival location. Nonetheless, our visual experience is of a *complete three-dimensional entity* (or at least purports to be). We enjoy a visual experience as of a façade of a *house*, not as of a *mere façade* (e.g., a stage-prop), where the latter would be experienced as a surface of a particular geometrical form. How, one might ask, is it the case that we enjoy a visual experience as of the relevant complete three-dimensional entity despite the fact we are limited in any concrete instance – that is, any token visual experience, considered by itself – to visually experiencing the side(s) facing us from a specific perspective or point of view?

The appeal to implicit intentionality in terms of inner horizons suggests the shape of an answer. For a subject to enjoy a visual experience as of a complete three-dimensional spatial object that visual experience must ‘go beyond itself’. It must in some sense involve or refer to those occluded or presently unseen back-sides (and voluminous insides) which (i) are not sense-perceptually given (which are strictly *not* visually experienced), and (ii) which cannot be sense-perceptually given while the subject is occupying the spatial perspective on the object they currently are. Indeed, the implicit reference in visual experience to such intentional horizons – in this case to occluded or presently unseen back-sides (and voluminous insides) – is central to explaining relevant phenomenal contrasts; say between typical visual experiences as of complete three-dimensional entities and *mere façades*, such as when we come to ‘see’ the building as a stage-prop after having discovered that, for example, it lacks any back-side and is a flat surface held up by supporting beams.

Providing a detailed explication of the form of horizontal intentionality specific to spatial perception – that is of the horizontal references to *unseen* sides of three-dimensional objects both in terms of what precisely those horizons are, and how they figure in the relevant visual experiences – is a complex task.³ Nonetheless, the broad idea extrapolated from this case is clear enough: the overall objective meaning or sense of an intentional experience, as given to the subject by way of its objectual phenomenology, requires reference to more of the object and its properties than what is given in such experiences with ‘intuitive fullness’; it also requires that experience somehow ‘points beyond itself’ to perspectives on the object that while not given with ‘intuitive fullness’ nonetheless are *co-given* with those aspects of the object which

³ While couched in different terminology various contemporary philosophers of perception offer different accounts of this feature of visual experience; see Schellenberg 2007: 604, 613; Kelly 2004: 98; Noë 2004: 60; Church 2011: 36; Nanay 2009: 307-9; Mitchell *forthcoming*.

‘properly appear’, and as such co-constitute the overall meaning or sense of that intentional experience, as an experience of its object as it given.⁴

Further detail, however, is required about the form of intentionality being adverted to here. First, it should be noted that Husserlian inner horizons are *not* to be theorized along the lines of *mere beliefs* about such absent profiles of the object. If this were the case, then we would have to give up the *prima facie* plausible claim that we typically non-inferentially perceive complete three-dimensional spatial entities. Explicating the horizontality of spatial perception in terms of a hypothesis concerning presently unseen sides has the effect of taking the relevant three-dimensional spatial contents out of the *perceptual* content of visual experience *proper*. Three-dimensional shape perception – a visual experience of the object before me as cubical, for example – would have to be modelled after *seeing that*, as including a conscious judicative component.⁵

Husserlian inner horizons are also not to be theorized in terms of co-present visualisations. Husserl rejects this proposal, and his reasons for doing so seem fairly decisive. Let me reconstruct the general thrust of his arguments. Let’s start by noting that visual imagination, like visual experience, is necessarily visualising from a specific spatial point of view.⁶ Visualising an unseen side of a three-dimensional object is necessarily a visualising of what is, in that visualising, given as a *facing side*. Now, what account is to be given of the horizontal references to the non-facing sides in the concurrent visualising? If we answer by appealing to ‘more visualisation’ this looks to generate an infinite regress – what about the horizontal references in this further visualisation, how are they are given? If on the other hand, we make recourse to a different account of the horizontal references then not only are we left having to say what more precisely these are – having pushed the problem of explaining horizontal references from perceptual experience to visualising – any answer is going to raise the further question of why we can’t just do away with visualisation for the perceptual case by appealing to whatever is being said of the horizontal references for visualisation.

⁴ For a recent challenge to this Husserlian thesis see Bower 2021. Husserl sometimes talks of the inner horizon as being given *emptily* (or as being constituted by ‘empty intentions’), in contrast to the supposed ‘intuitive fullness’ with which the profile of the object that we are currently presented with is given (e.g., the facing sides I can see). At least in the case of visual experience this distinction between ‘full’ and ‘empty’ turns on the presence (or not) of *sensory content*.

⁵ Such a proposal is also at odds with the way visual experience can be belief-independent and how this plays out in visual illusions (see Evans 1982: 123-4 on belief-independence).

⁶ See Williams 1966 and Peacocke 1985.

However, it might be responded that the causal-functional roles between the visual presentation of the facing side, and the visualised backside, are such that each one counts as representing different parts of the same object. Put otherwise, we can enjoy a unified representation of a complete three-dimensional object, because the different presentations serve the function of *making up for what is missing* in their counterpart. However, this response generates a further worry. If this is correct, then both presentations themselves must already include horizontal references such that the respective presentations are able to serve the function of being *fulfilments of what is missing in their counterpart* (and if they didn't include such horizontal references their unification would be unmotivated). But if that is right, then the original presentations themselves are already – prior to any respective appeal to perception or visualisation in either case - necessarily constituted by horizontal references. Put otherwise: if the two presentations are not to just arbitrarily 'put together' but are to form a well-motivated unified representation of the same object then their ability to do so – through acting as fulfilments for what is missing in each other respectively – means that there must *already* be horizontal references in each of those presentations, such that the respective presentation could act as a fulfilment of *that* component in the other which 'refers beyond'. If we accept this line of argument, then the view looks to be redundant. Here is how Husserl puts the point:

But that is already to say that every such imagination is a full phantasy, which could also exist for itself as a mere phantasy and which binds the presentation to the components that refer beyond. Likewise, it is to say that *perception*, even without phantasy, delivers a full representation, namely as presentation of the front side along with components that refer beyond. (Husserl 1907: 48)

So, for the imagination view to say something plausible about how the visual presentation and visualised presentation are to be unified reveals that the relevant presentations must already include horizontal references, and which (crucially) in the perceptual case are *not* to be explained by reference to the visualising of alternative perspectives on the objects of those presentations.⁷

⁷ One might think these arguments only go through if we accept the Husserlian claim (see 1997: §18) that visual imagination has an inner horizon which is structurally analogous to the inner horizon for spatial object perception. The advocate of the imagination account of inner horizons may want to deny this in the case of visualising (cf. Sartre 2004: Ch.1 who claims that since imagination only involves *what one puts into it*, it can't involve any 'passively' given inner horizon). For what it is worth I don't think that this Sartrean claim is particularly plausible.

A more promising way of explicating the intentionality of inner horizons is by reference to the idea that intentional experiences involve non-propositional attitudes of *anticipation or expectation* concerning the possibility of, in one or a series of future experiences, bringing to ‘intuitive fullness’ those indeterminate aspects, profiles, or perspectives on the object that in the current experiential moment are ‘absent’ or not so (determinately) given – what Husserl refers to as the ‘possibility of verification by a corresponding fulfilling presentation’.⁸ It would be in these terms that we could understand, even if only in outline, the kind of implicit intentionality that is substantively different from the ‘explicit’ intentionality which concerns itself with profiles of the object as they are presented here and now. The details of how such a proposal might work will differ across different intentional modalities. In the case of visual perception one suggestion is that such anticipatory non-propositional attitudes are to be understood in terms of forms of sensori-motor activity connected to the possibility of bodily movement; but such a claim seems less applicable to cases of intentional experiences in which practical activity and movement are less important (e.g., affectivity, imagination, and cognition).⁹ Nonetheless with the idea of an inner horizon for intentional experiences clarified let me move on to consider our target experiences.

2. Affective-Evaluative Experiences and Intentional Bases

To properly understand the claim that affective-evaluative experiences include an inner horizon, we first have to detail what is meant by affective-evaluative experiences. The kinds of experiences I have in mind are exemplified in a range of cases of *conscious occurrent emotions* and states similar to them. For example, an affective-evaluative experience in this sense could be an episode of indignation in which an individual is experienced as offensive, or a case in which a subject is moved by the beauty of a painting. Further to this, cases of *affective desire* in which the object of desire is experienced as attractive would also be part of this class. What is essential to these experiences, aside from the fact that they are manifestly intentional and evaluative, is that they are valenced, and in line with one significant proposal in the literature (which is also present in early phenomenological thinkers) it is plausible to think the valence is (at least partly) phenomenologically manifest in terms of valenced attitudes constitutive of the experience.¹⁰ Given this, let me offer the following definition of an affective-evaluative experience:

⁸ See Husserl 1977: §50.

⁹ Context and background knowledge will also play a significant role (e.g., one’s familiarity with the object).

¹⁰ See Poellner 2016; Müller 2019; Mitchell 2022; see also Scheler 1973.

Def of Affective-Evaluative Experience: a non-doxastic valenced experience of a particular object (physical particular, person, event, and state of affairs involving these things) ‘under’ an evaluative aspect, or as having a certain evaluative standing. The relevant value is presented on the basis of valenced attitudes of favour (in the case of positive value) and disfavour (in the case of negative value).

The presence of a valenced attitudinal component serves to distinguish affective-evaluative experiences from putative non-valenced evaluative perceptions, and value judgements. Affective-evaluative experiences are *attitudinally-valenced* experiences of value. It is a matter of debate in philosophy of emotion how to precisely cash out the evaluative dimension – but let’s grant that in paradigm cases of affective-evaluative experiences it is the *particular object* of the relevant experiences which seem to possess the relevant *evaluative property*. In this context, this needn’t imply more than a point about the objectual evaluative phenomenology of such experiences – it is the individual who seems manifestly rude, the cake which seems manifestly desirable, the painting which seems manifestly beautiful.¹¹ Clearly, such experiences – as non-doxastic affectively valenced experiences of value – are not *value judgements*, although such experiences may stand in rational and epistemic relations to such judgements which are made on their basis (detailing that connection won’t concern me here).

Now, given that it is sufficiently clear what the target experiences are we can ask the following question. In what possible sense might affective-evaluative experiences include an inner horizon, such that in addition to their explicit intentionality (the object presented under an evaluative aspect on the basis of a valenced attitude), they have an implicit intentionality, referring to aspects of the particular object which are not given in ‘intuitive fullness’, and so which are in some sense ‘absent’ or ‘not intuitively present’. And more than that: this inner horizon would not merely accompany the relevant explicit intentionality but would contribute essentially to the overall sense or meaning of that affective-evaluative experience. Indeed – and drawing on the idea that such inner horizons can be understood in terms of *anticipations* of future possible experiential presentations of the object – what, in the case of affective-evaluative experiences, might a subject be experientially anticipating, and how might such anticipations co-constitute the overall meaning or sense of such experiences?

To get more clarity on this issue, let’s focus on a specific case. Say I am walking through Florence and come across the *Duomo di Firenze* (the Florence Cathedral). I am stopped in my tracks and overawed by its beauty. What I undergo is an affective-evaluative experience, in

¹¹ I don’t take a stand here on whether the analysis that follows could be accepted by a view which places the evaluative dimension of these experiences in their *attitudinal component* (see Deonna and Teroni 2015).

which a physical particular (the Cathedral) is the intentional object. And what *seems beautiful or stunning* to me, is precisely that – the *Duomo di Firenze* in all its glory, and a key part of this experience is my affective attitude, as a subjective ‘affirmation’ of the majesty of what I am confronted with, as an attitudinal acknowledgment of its beauty, which takes the form of a *felt approval or favour* concerning the relevant instance of beauty. No doubt there is more that could be said about such experiences of aesthetic admiration in general. But for our purposes the pertinent question is whether such an experience necessarily includes an inner horizon, such that the overall sense or meaning of that experience *qua* its objectual phenomenology requires some implicit intentionality in terms of anticipatory intentional attitudes concerning future possible presentations of the object (and its properties).

Now, there is one way of vindicating that claim. Namely that affective-evaluative experiences *inherit* an inner horizon from the intentional state on which they are based. Let me unpack this view, first explaining the idea that such experiences have intentional basing states.

It is widely accepted that affective-evaluative experiences, and specifically forms of conscious occurrent emotion, are not self-standing intentional relations to or experiences of their objects. Rather, such experiences ‘inherit’ their particular objects, and so at least part of their intentional content, from other intentional states on which they are dependant. These have been called the *cognitive bases* of emotions, of which the paradigms are occurrent thoughts and judgements, episodic memories, imaginations (both propositional and visual), and sense-perceptual experiences – but such cognitive bases presumptively cover the full range of experiential modes.¹²

Simply put, an affective-evaluative experience has the particular object it has because the intentional base state has the particular object that it has. Examples are as follows: admiring the musical performance that one is *hearing*; being afraid of the dog that one can *see*; experiencing disgust at the rotten meat one is *tasting*. In these cases, the intentional base state is italicised.¹³ Given this, let’s accept what we might call the content dependency claim: affective-evaluative experiences inherit their non-evaluative content from their intentional bases.

Now, returning to our main theme, we might wonder how the content-dependency claim could vindicate the idea that affective-evaluative experiences have an inner horizon. Let’s return to our previous example of being overawed by the beauty of the *Duomo di Firenze*. In the case as described the relevant affective-evaluative experience is *dependent* on, and so has as

¹² See Deonna and Teroni 2012: 5, 29, 78; 2015: 299-300.

¹³ One might think a similar claim applies to phenomenal affective desire – to feel ‘drawn’ to the attractive individual I have to be in some sense *presented* with them, or represent them.

its intentional base, a visual experience. In this case, I *see* the *Duomo di Firenze* and am overcome with admiration. Now, drawing on considerations concerning the case of visual experience, if we find it plausible that visual experience has an inner horizon relating to perspectives on the object – which while not currently given in ‘intuitive fullness’ are nonetheless ‘emptily’ anticipated (and co-constitute the object as a complete three-dimensional spatial thing) – then we might be drawn to the claim that affective-evaluative experience, in this case aesthetic admiration, simply *inherits* this inner horizon. As such, the implicit intentionality of my affective-experience *qua* inner horizon is no more than the inner horizon of the visual perception on which it is based, such that it also inherits this horizontal intentional dimension of the relevant visual experience. More specifically, in this case, we might say that I ‘emptily’ anticipate occupying possible alternative (albeit reasonably indeterminate) spatial perspectives on the *Duomo di Firenze* which would ‘reveal’ presently unseen sides.

Again bracketing the finer details of how the inner horizon of visual experience works, the guiding idea in our context is as follows: whatever horizontal intentionality affective-evaluative experience involves is *entirely determined* by whatever horizontal intentionality co-constitutes the meaning or sense of the relevant basing state. Put simply: the inner horizon of affective-evaluative experience is just the inner horizon of the relevant intentional basing state. For this idea to be generalizable across all possible intentional bases for affective-evaluative experiences we would have to consider in detail possible inner horizons for the full range of intentional bases (e.g., imagination, memory, thought etc.).¹⁴ But at least in principle there isn’t any obvious reason – given we are partial to the claim that a range of non-affective intentional experiences have inner horizons – that a similar pattern of explanation couldn’t be offered in non-sense-perceptual cases.

Nonetheless, there is something odd about this way of positing a inner horizon for affective-evaluative experiences. It looks to be dependent on the idea that *all the intentional features* a basing state has, including some putative ‘inner horizon’, must be inherited by the affective-evaluative experience; that my admiration of the *Duomo di Firenze*, insofar it is based on instance of *seeing it*, must also implicitly represent (via the relevant anticipatory attitudes) its currently occluded or absent sides (e.g., the rear side of the Cathedral), insofar as the visual experience does so. But there doesn’t look to be an overriding reason to accept this entailment. Sticking with the case at hand, visual experiences may have all kinds of fine-grained contents (e.g., fine-grained colour contents) that are more or less irrelevant to affective-evaluative representation, and are not necessarily ‘inherited’ by the emotional states which have them as basing states. In any case what is required if we are to posit an ‘inner horizon’ for affective-

¹⁴ See Jorba 2020 for a development of the idea that experiential thought includes an inner horizon.

evaluative experience is a proposal which can be more strongly motivated than the one just discussed.

3. An Affective-Evaluative Inner Horizon

3.1 Normative Phenomenology

In this section I explore the claim that affective-evaluative experiences have a *sui generis* inner horizon, that while related to their non-evaluative content (as provided by their intentional base), turns on the distinctive character of those experiences as affective-evaluative experiences.

Let me begin with the following thought: If we are going to justify the positing of a *sui generis* affective-evaluative inner horizon, then we need to show that there is something about the objectual (evaluative) phenomenology of such experiences for which some such appeal is necessary; remember in the case of visual experience the positing of inner horizons is well-motivated as a solution to what we can call the *problem of overall visual-spatial sense*. In this section I outline what that ‘something’ might be by reference to the claim that conscious occurrent emotions (and those experiences sufficiently similar to them, i.e., affective desire, affectively-loaded aesthetic experience) have a kind of normative phenomenology.

Here is how Peter Poellner frames the objectual evaluative phenomenology of affective-evaluative experiences:

Experiencing something transparently as a value requires experiencing it as making a ‘demand’ of some sort. What kind of demand is this supposed to be...the talk of ‘demand’ here is slightly misleading: grasping something as a demand is not the same as grasping that demand to be justified. But presumably, when I experience something as a value and I take that experience at face value, I do take its ‘demand’, whatever it is, to be justified...What the terminology of an ideal ought-to-be seeks to capture is the familiar intuition that to acknowledge something to be of positive value is to acknowledge that it pro tanto merits or deserves to be or remain actualised, while to acknowledge something to be of negative value is to acknowledge that it pro tanto merits not to be (or remain) realised. (Poellner 2016: 265-6)

One aspect of this view is that values as presented in affective-evaluative experiences have a distinctively normative profile. More specifically, those values are experienced as making *justified demands*, where we understand that to mean that they convey to the subject of the relevant experience that they should or shouldn’t be instantiated, and should or shouldn’t *remain* instantiated or ‘realised’. To think of the affective experience of values in this way is to

think of those experiences as having a distinctive kind of normative objectual phenomenology – as such, this normative dimension would be a definitive part of the overall evaluative sense or meaning of those experiences (i.e., an experience of value *requires* it).

However, as a claim about affective-evaluative experiences objectual phenomenology what reason do we have to accept this? Poellner presents it as following from a ‘transparent’ – that is unprejudiced and ‘theory-free’ – description of *what-it-is-like* to experience values in an affective mode.

Let me first respond to a general worry about the claim. It might be said that the kinds of normative and evaluative properties being adverted to simply cannot be part of the *contents of objective experience*. Here one might have in a mind a prior commitment to a specific metaphysical theory of content, whereby conscious content is determined by causal tracking of environmental features by our sensory systems, and since there is simply no appropriate detection mechanism in the offing – no peripheral nerve endings or organs for detecting normative-evaluative properties – then it is simply a mistake to construe such properties as objective properties of the world, encountered in affective experience and so figuring in the intentional content of those experiences. However, clearly such a view is not *theory-free* in the way that an unprejudiced description of the phenomenology of the relevant experiences should be. And further to this we can aim to accurately describe the normative phenomenology of such experiences without committing to any metaphysical theory about the *nature* of normative-evaluative properties. What is therefore required in this context of determining more clearly the objective phenomenology of the relevant class of experiences is *descriptive* adequacy rather than metaphysical-theoretical (or indeed causal-explanatory) adequacy.

Given this, let’s apply the view to some concrete cases. Say I am struck by the rudeness of an individual’s behaviour. According to the view under consideration, this involves an experience of offensiveness (more precisely, an experience of the *behaviour as offensive*, or of *offensive behaviour*). It seems reasonable to say that part of the experience of indignation, in terms of its objectual evaluative phenomenology, includes a sense that ‘this’, the offensive behaviour, should not be or remain the case. Something is amiss ‘in the world’ when we find ourselves taken aback by an instance of rudeness, such that something which is the case (a putative exemplification of rudeness), ‘ought not to be’ or ought not to *remain so*. Indeed, this is reflected in the kinds of actions and behaviours which emotions like indignation motivate, as ‘correctives’ which seek to redress the instantiation of something, a negative value, which *ought not to remain realised*. We might express this normative aspect of the phenomenology of indignation with such phrases as ‘he shouldn’t have done that’, ‘that wasn’t right’, ‘you shouldn’t behave like that’, and so on (a similar account rings true in cases of jealousy, envy, and resentment).

What about the positive case? Let's return to our central example, that of being overawed by the *beauty* of the *Duomo di Firenze*. According to the proposal we are considering this involves an affective experience of its beauty. Arguably a necessary aspect of the phenomenology of appreciation and aesthetic emotions, is that the values associated with them – beauty, grace, harmony, excellence – are, as positive values, experienced as deserving to *remain instantiated*. What might support this? Similar considerations as in the case of negative value: we would lament the destruction of the beautiful object, and might take significant measures to preserve and/or protect it. Similarly, we are sorrowful about the destruction or contamination of nature when we take the relevant natural settings to be splendid or awesome. While these considerations are somewhat indirect, one explanation of our motivation to pursue such value-preserving activities and adopt such attitudes would be to appeal to an affective experience of those positive values which necessarily includes their manifesting the relevant normative profile, such that beauty, grace, harmony, excellence, and so on, are experienced as deserving 'to be' and deserving to remain actual *qua* features of the particular objects which they qualify, and that it is part of a transparent affective experience of these values to 'affectively acknowledge' – by way of the relevant affective attitudes of favour and disfavour – them as having this normative status.¹⁵

As a connected thought, note that an aspect of our folk discourse about emotions suggests this normative dimension. We commonly talk about our emotional experiences in such a way that reflects the idea that the contents of those experiences are *compelling, arresting, gripping, irresistible, enchanting*, and more broadly have a certain power over us. And this is not simply a matter of the objects of our emotional experiences capturing and consuming attention (which they do), since all kinds of objects and states of affairs capture attention without our experiences of them being accurately described in the passion-laden terms just surveyed.¹⁶ Rather such descriptions tap into something distinctively normative in emotions' objectual phenomenology.

However, even someone sympathetic to the idea that affective-evaluative experiences involve some normative dimension (broadly) along the lines specified might claim that it is more plausible that these normative relations or properties (i.e., that a positive value deserves to be or remain actualised, and a negative value deserves not to be or remain realised) are better theorised as judged contents rather than non-judicative experiential contents. Further to this,

¹⁵ NB: Importantly, the claim need not be that all emotional phenomena admit of this characterisation. There may be truncated or pathological emotional responses which do not fit this model.

¹⁶ For more on the emotion attention link see Brady 2015; Mitchell 2022.

they might suggest that it is certainly no more obvious that such normativity is part of a non-judicative content than part of some normative judgement co-present with the experience.

There are several responses to this worry. Perhaps the most significant thought though is that a merely judged content is often not sufficient to motivate the kinds of behaviours, actions, and attitudes which were considered in the descriptions of the cases above. Merely judging that <the beauty of nature ought to be preserved,> or that <the offensive comment ought not to stand>, is often insufficient to motivate the relevant value-guided actions. Contrastingly, it is plausible that an *experienced* value, at least when the experience and its content is taken at face value, is necessarily motivating (given standard background conditions obtain). Analogously, consider how it is often thought that mere normative beliefs about what one should or shouldn't do can fail to motivate subjects to take appropriate steps to realise or adhere to the relevant norm.

However, the critic might grant that *some* values are encountered in this normative way, but are there not affective experiences of positive values (at least) that don't plausibly have some such normative phenomenology. Take an emotional response to a beautiful sunset. Say we account for this as suggested: there is a felt favouring (or attraction) which – as the affectively valenced component – serves to register the sunset as valuable (or beautiful etc.), which necessarily includes a sense that the sunset's beauty merits to be or remain exemplified.

But this seems like a misdescription for the case at hand. Isn't it the case that, in certain kinds of affective responses, the object (e.g., the sunset) instantiates a value which is transient, and by its (experiential) nature cannot remain actualized. Moreover, one might think it partly constitutive of the evaluative significance of certain kinds of objects that they admit of a similar relatively limited temporal qualifier (i.e., only go on for some time). We would quickly become bored with a sunset that went on for hours and hours; part of its value, and our interest in it, seems connected to its ephemeral nature.

However, the defender of the view on offer has the resources to meet this objection. They might argue that for as long as one is receptive to the positive value, one wants the event and the value it instantiates – such as it is – to go on, it is just that for various reasons we cannot continue to be receptive to certain kinds of value for any great length of time (hence we become bored or insensitive quickly). Arguably though, this misses the point, if what such examples are intended to direct us toward is that at least some values by their nature 'merit' only a transient instantiation, such that part of what we value is their transience. So, the account of offer should grant that there are values that are such as to merit only transient instantiation. Yet the formulation of the relevant normative dimension – that the values 'deserve to be *or* to remain instantiated' – is sufficiently broad to allow for such cases. The 'remain instantiated' here can cover those many positive things which are experienced as *deserving to go on* for longer

than they ordinarily in fact do (e.g., youthful vigour). What we don't want to say, and what the formulation doesn't require, is that *every* positive value is intrinsically such as to merit something like *permanent* or 'eternal' instantiation, which would be implausible. No doubt there is more to be said about this issue, but let's proceed on the basis that the account on offer has the resources to meet such a challenge.

3.2 Inner Horizons and deserving 'to be' or 'not to be'

Say we accept that affective-evaluative experiences exhibit this normative objectual phenomenology; those experiences, in the positive case, involve experiencing the relevant value, for example the object's beauty, as an 'ideal ought to be', which *deserves to remain realised*. Now, we might think that the explicit intentionality of an affective-evaluative experience – what is strictly given or 'primordially' presented – is *insufficient* to constitute the overall meaning or sense of an experience which includes that kind of normative objectual phenomenology. Let me explain.

There seems to be a sense or meaning gap between an affective-evaluative experience in which, on the basis of an explicit thematic intentional act – the character of an object is given as instantiated 'here and now'¹⁷ – and an experience of that *object's value, as a value which deserves to remain actualised*. Put simply: the explicit component representing the object's character *here and now* can't suffice for an experience of the relevant value, as something deserving to remain actualised.¹⁸ Why is this? Well, to experience something as a value in that distinctively normative way – as deserving to remain actualised – plausibly involves experiencing it as making a *demand on the future*, which as temporally indexed to future, requires a reference to something that goes beyond any particular exposure to the object. So, we can see that the idea of something *deserving to remain actualised*, is the kind of thing that necessarily refers to some kind of possible (future) experience in which it does in fact remain actualised, insofar as it should.

So, if we think there is this gap between the overall normative-evaluative sense of affective-evaluative experiences and their explicit affective-evaluative intentionality (the object's character as it is presented 'here and now') then we now have a space which appeal to the idea of an inner affective-evaluative horizon can fill.

¹⁷ This doesn't depend on the cognitive base being sense-perception. We might think that 'the fearsomeness of a situation' can be 'present to us now', in a case where the non-evaluative content is given by way of thought, imagination, memory.

¹⁸ Note: this idea of an experience of a value as something which 'ought to be preserved' or 'deserves to remain actualised' finds no obvious parallel in non-normative cases of sense-perception.

Here is how we can flesh this out in the positive case: To experience the relevant positive value as *deserving to remain actualised* requires an implicit reference to one or a series of future *possible* affective-evaluative experiences of the relevant object's value in which it could be 'verified' that the value *continues to be* instantiated insofar as it *deserves to remain actualised*. What we then get is the following structure: insofar as the value (the object's beauty) is experienced as deserving to remain actualised, and so as making a *demand on the future*, we implicitly anticipate it 'in fact' remaining actualised, that is to say we implicitly anticipate the *satisfaction of the normative demand on the future* that the value makes (so to speak).¹⁹ If this is right then my affective-evaluative experience, as exhibiting the relevant normative objectual evaluative phenomenology, would have to involve an implicit anticipation of future 'value-confirming' affective-evaluative experiences. Note though, in line with the broad idea of an inner horizon what I anticipate in terms of such value-confirmation could be reasonably indeterminate in the sense that I needn't anticipate any specific value-confirming experiences, in terms of affective-evaluative experiences with a determinate content. Nonetheless, my affective-evaluative experience would include some such implicit anticipation of the *possibility of such future* experiences of value-confirmation, as a particular kind of 'protentive' horizonal awareness of future-value in the experience itself.²⁰

At this point it is important to make clearer a distinction between what we can call the *factual value horizon* and the *normative value horizon*. The factual value horizon may simply be the implicit anticipation that a given value, now instantiated, will or will not continue. Structurally this is analogous to non-evaluative temporal horizons, as those 'passive protentions' discussed by Husserl.²¹ For example, I can be implicitly aware of a moving object as something that will in fact soon come to an abrupt halt by hitting a wall it is moving towards. The *normative value horizon*, which is the topic of our discussion, relates to the idea that something, specifically an objects' value, *ought or ought not to continue*, and which as such makes a normative demand on the future. As such it is right to think that 'confirmation' has a somewhat different character in the descriptive vs the normative-evaluative cases, and this is reflected in the different character of the anticipatory states involved in the relevant experiences. In the descriptive case we have merely a *will-form* (e.g., if I move around the object, its currently occluded side *will* come into

¹⁹ See 3.3 for discussion of the negative case, in which we anticipate the possibility of the value ceasing to exist, or ceasing to be realised.

²⁰ Although not framed in terms of normative phenomenology Husserl gestures in a similar direction concerning value-horizons: 'Just as there is, however, a sort of representing from afar, an empty representational intending which is not a being in the presence of the object, so there is a feeling which relates to the object emptily' (1989, §4: p.12).

²¹ See Husserl 1990.

view). In the normative-evaluative case, the relevant anticipatory state has a more complex character, insofar as a recognition of the relevant *demand on the future* gives the anticipatory state something like a ‘it will because it should’ form, akin to a form of *experienced normative confidence* in the coming to pass of the relevant evaluative state of affairs.²²

Before we see how this analysis plays out in more detail let me draw attention to the following issue. Clearly, if the above account is right, such that the horizontal component (so specified) is *essential* to the experience of something *as valuable*, then the non-horizontal ‘explicit’ component cannot be sufficient for a presentation of the value. But then, it might be asked, what more precisely is it that is represented by what we have been calling the explicit intentionality of the experience on its own (that component of the experience which is given with ‘intuitive fullness’). Above we just talked of *the object’s character as it is presented ‘here and now’*. One suggestion is that the explicit component of the experience represents something like a *temporal profile of the relevant value instance*, as akin to its ‘now phase’, as a kind of *glance of value*.²³

The idea would then be that this temporal profile of the relevant value instance, its ‘now phase’ – this *glance of value* – is such as to motivate the relevant horizontal components, being such as to demand its continuation, but nonetheless is, considered by itself, insufficient for the *full experience of value*. Since the latter, as an experience of value as something which ought or ought not continue, requires that implicit reference to one or a series of future *possible* affective-evaluative experiences of the relevant object’s value in which it could be ‘verified’ that the value continues to be instantiated insofar as it deserves to be, as given on the basis of that non-intuitively fulfilled, ‘empty’ affective-evaluative horizon (something which clearly goes beyond the ‘now phase’ of the relevant value instance). The situation is therefore structurally analogous to the way – in spatial perception – an exposure to the profile of a cube which, say, merely presents three of its faces, may be such as to motivate the relevant inner horizons (i.e., the implicit anticipations of currently unseen or obscured faces which could be brought to ‘intuitive fullness’ in some future course of experience), but is, *considered by itself*, insufficient for an experience of a complete three-dimensional object (namely a cube).

With the view clarified. Let’s now apply this analysis to our stock-case. Walking through Florence I am overawed by the *majestic beauty* of the *Duomo di Firenze*. This affective-evaluative

²² Note if this is right way of thinking about affective-evaluative horizons then there is another disanalogy between the ‘inner horizon’ of spatial perception vs. that of affective-evaluative experience, since we no longer have the idea in play in the affective-evaluative case of some *further new aspect* of the object being presented or some *further determination* of the object which is being implicitly anticipated, but rather just a confirmation of the same object evaluated in the same way. Nonetheless, I think there are clearly enough similarities between the cases to maintain talk of an ‘inner horizon’ for affective-evaluative experience.

²³ Ibid: 35. See Husserl 1989: §4.

experience, on the account sketched above, necessarily includes a sense of the beauty of the *Duomo di Firenze* as *deserving to remain actualised* (as an essential part of *what-it-is-like* to experience this value). Nonetheless, what is strictly given to me with ‘intuitive fullness’ is merely the character of the *Duomo di Firenze* ‘here and now’ (the ‘now phase’ of the value instance), a *mere glance* of its beauty. So, for my experience to be one where the overall ‘meaning’ includes that sense of the beauty of the *Duomo di Firenze*, as a beauty which *deserves to remain actualised*, it must include an inner horizon. More specifically, what I implicitly anticipate, and what co-constitutes the sense of an overall experience of the *Duomo di Firenze* as beautiful, as an experience of a value that deserves to be and to remain actualised, are possible future affective-evaluative experiences which transcend my current experience. As such the experience includes an implicit intentional component which ‘emptily’ points towards some such further instances of affective-acknowledgement, which would amount to a confirmation of its *continued beauty*. Given that the cognitive base of my experience is a visual experience, the relevant future affective-evaluative experiences typically will be *visually based* (after all, I could hardly ‘confirm’ that the value remains actualised merely in imagination or thought), but even granting that, we are clearly dealing with a distinctive affective-evaluative inner horizon which concerns ‘normative value confirmation’.

3.3 *The negative case and disappointment*

To further build the case for the view under discussion it is helpful to see the analysis played out in the negative case.

Let’s take the example of being taken aback by an instance of offensive behaviour, say an unpleasant comment made by a colleague. In a now familiar pattern of analysis this would involve an affective experience of its particular object (the comment) as *offensive*. Now, if the account of the relevant objectual phenomenology presented at the beginning of the previous section was correct this will necessarily include a sense of that *offensiveness* as something which ‘should not be’, or should not *remain to be the case* – the relevant instance of offensiveness ‘ought not’ to remain instantiated (that is part of what it is to experience a disvalue). Yet, is it really the case, that as with the discussion of aesthetic admiration for the beauty of the *Duomo di Firenze*, the overall meaning or sense of such an experience of offense, requires an affective-evaluative inner horizon? What form would this take? Insofar as we are dealing with a putative experience of disvalue, such that the relevant value *deserves not to be* and *deserves not to remain instantiated*, then presumably the relevant inner horizon would have to involve an (implicit) anticipation of future possible experiences in which that evaluative property was *no longer instantiated insofar as it shouldn’t be*. The claim is of course not that what we anticipate is that the

object should cease to exist (or at least not in paradigm cases), but rather that the object should in some respect or other change *so as to no longer have the disvalue it now has*.²⁴

Let's play this analysis out further in the case at hand. In experiencing the *rudeness* of the comment as an 'ideal ought not to be', as a disvalue that deserves *not* to be, it should be clear that the explicit intentionality of my experience merely involves a presentation of the character of the object as instantiated 'here and now' (the 'now phase' of the disvalue instance, a *glance of rudeness*), and as such 'falls short' or is inadequate to the (aforementioned) overall sense of the affective-evaluative experience with its normative objectual phenomenology. Insofar as my experience, as an experience of value, involves an affective acknowledgement of the relevant value as something which *ought not to remain instantiated*, then that experience has to implicitly refer beyond the 'present moment'. Insofar as the rudeness 'ought not to remain instantiated' we might think it has to be the case that my experience implicitly anticipates some *future experience* in which that value is no longer instantiated, in accordance with that 'normative demand'; such that what I anticipate is that the object should in some respect or other change so as to no longer have the disvalue it now has. Naturally, it remains to be seen if the analysis could be extended to all negative affective-evaluative experiences, but it at least finds reasonable application to the cases so far considered.

Are there further considerations that can be drawn on to bolster the account? One might appeal to a range of subsequent affective attitudes that occur in instances of *actual* value (dis)confirmation. Let me explain first how this is supposed to work in the non-evaluative spatial case. One way in which it is argued that the relevant inner horizon of implicit passive 'protentions' or expectations – those anticipations of future possible alternative 'revealing' perspectives of the object which are not currently given in 'intuitive fullness' – come to be recognised as present in the original experience, and as essential to the relevant overall sense or meaning of spatial perception, are in perceptual scenarios in which they become more or

²⁴ A more complex proposal might be that the relevant affective-evaluative horizons are not just *temporal* but also *modal* (and specifically counter-factual). In the negative case, the 'empty intention' would refer not just to the future but to an unactualised possibility, specifically the *absence* of that specific instance of rude behaviour; so not just that something should change but that it should not have been instantiated in the first place (contrasting with what is the case), such that the world is a 'worse' place for having this *disvaluable object* in it. In the positive case the modal dimension of the affective-evaluative horizon would involve something like an implicit reference to non-existence of the object (as contrasting with what is the case), such that we have a sense that the world is somehow 'better' for having this valuable object in it. This modal (counter-factual) dimension would mark out a further difference between the kinds of descriptive horizons co-constitutive of spatial perception, and the evaluative horizons co-constitutive of affective-evaluative experience.

less explicit by being confounded given how the object *in fact* comes to present itself – as a ‘break with harmony’.²⁵ For example, consider my surprise when the building I walk around turns out to be a carefully crafted stage-prop. Arguably my surprise is reflective of the (non-affective) ‘disappointment’ of my anticipations concerning *how the object was expected to be* (even if that way was somewhat indeterminate), which in the original visual experience were merely *implicit* or unattended to, but now can be brought into focus as I walk round the object and enjoy a ‘disconfirming’ experience. Now if one finds this a plausible way of inferring the presence of inner horizons in spatial object perception, then it is worthwhile seeing whether similar considerations can be mapped on to affective-evaluative inner horizons currently under discussion.

Consider the following (reasonably dramatic) extension of our stock-case. Say some time later that day I revisit the same area of Florence, but come to see that the *Duomo di Firenze* has been destroyed, and am overcome with a sense of *sadness* and *loss*. Doesn’t this show, so the defender of the view under consideration might maintain, that what we had been implicitly anticipating in our original experience was some indistinct future experience of its value, in which the beauty which was originally experienced as an ‘ideal ought to be’ *remained actualised*, and we are significantly moved insofar as this expectation is thwarted. Note that there is one reading of such a case in which we are merely talking about the *factual value horizon*. It might be said that what we are disappointed by in this case is just that *something good* which we implicitly anticipated continuing to exist (indeed as buildings usually do) in fact didn’t do so.

But we are interested in the *normative value horizon*. The claim is that it is not merely some such factual value expectation that was disappointed but rather a normative one. The reason I am sad is because I originally experienced this good thing *as something that ought to have real permanence* (beyond its ‘now phase’), as an ‘ideal ought to be’ that ‘deserves to remain instantiated’, and what my sadness registers is a disappointment of this normative ‘demand on the future’. Put otherwise: what our palpable feeling of loss in this moment conveys to us is that something that was experienced as ‘deserving-to-continue-to-be’ is no more. We might think such a reaction would be unmotivated if our original affective-evaluative didn’t have the inner horizon it has been suggested it does.²⁶ If an *experience of beauty* was possible solely on the

²⁵ See Husserl 1973: §21a.

²⁶ Note, normative value horizons are not to be confused with sentiments as kinds of *affective dispositions*, which form part of an explanation of why we feel emotions in the specific situations that we do (see Deonna and Teroni 2021: ch.9). Normative value horizons are part of the intentional structure of affective-evaluative experiences and have an explanatory role *qua* the normative experience of value that is significantly different from that of sentiments.

basis of its explicit intentionality, its intentional structure being exhaustively captured in terms of the object's being presented merely as it is here and now, then such subsequent attitudes in the case of 'normative disappointment' would be puzzling. So, one might think that as in the spatial case discussed above, further support for positing *sui generis* affective-evaluative inner horizons can be garnered from consideration of such cases of normative disappointment.²⁷

Conclusion

A central, if puzzling, claim of Classical Phenomenology is that intentional experiences involve a specific kind of implicit intentionality, which accompanies the relevant explicit intentionality. This implicit intentionality is purportedly co-constitutive of the object-presenting phenomenology of those intentional experiences, as an inner horizon. This paper has attempted to motivate the view that affective-evaluative experiences are constituted by their own *sui generis* inner horizon. It has done so by appealing to a distinctive aspect of such experiences, namely their normative objectual phenomenology. While there are certainly grounds for objecting to various claims appealed to here, and no doubt further problems and problem cases to be considered, the view considered provides one way of vindicating positing inner horizons in the domain of affective-evaluative experiences.

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²⁷ I encourage the reader to explore similar considerations in the negative case. Consider the palpable feelings of *affective disappointment* when one realises that the individual who made the homophobic comment is still 'getting away with it' – that a disvalue one experienced as an ideal ought-not-to-be has (unfortunately) *remained instantiated*, the 'object' not having changed so as to no longer exhibit that disvalue.

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